Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment by Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary
Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social
Preferences: An Experiment
Antonio Cabrales and Gary Charness*
June 26, 2000
Abstract: It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-
compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own
material wealth.  However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous
experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in
mechanism design and contract theory.  Accordingly, we devise an experiment to
explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context.  A principal proposes one
of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible
contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal.  The agents know
the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered
in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent
leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties.  While all three
possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees.  We observe
numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where
one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation
payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their
types.  Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences,
strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.
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1The classic ‘lemons’ paper (Akerlof 1970) illustrated the point that asymmetric
information led to economic inefficiency, and could even destroy an efficient market.
Research on mechanism design has sought ways to minimize or eliminate this problem.
Seminal research includes the auction results of Vickrey (1961) and the optimal taxation
study by Mirrlees (1971).  Applications include public and regulatory economics (Laffont
and Tirole 1993), labor economics (Weiss 1991, Lazear 1997), financial economics (Freixas
and Rochet 1997), business management (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), and development
economics (Ray 1998).
It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible
mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth.
However, while this assumption is a useful point of departure for a theoretical examination,
economic interactions frequently are associated with social approval or disapproval.  In
dozens of experiments, many people appear to be motivated by some form of social
preferences, such as altruism, difference aversion, or reciprocity.  Recently, contract
theorists such as Casadesus-Masanell (1999) and Rob and Zemsky (1999) have expressed
the view that contract theory could be made more descriptive and effective by incorporating
some form of nonpecuniary utility into the analysis.
We consider the explanatory power of recent social preference models (e.g., Bolton
and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, and Charness and Rabin 1999) in our
contractual environment. Our aim is to investigate whether incorporating social preferences
into contract theory could lead to a better understanding of how work motivation and
performance are linked, and to thereby improve firms’ contract and employment choices, as
well as productivity and efficiency.
2Adverse selection refers to the situation where the agent knows more about her1
“type” than the principal does at the time of contracting.2  In the standard scenario on which
we focus, a firm hires a worker but knows less than the worker does about her innate work
disutility. Other typical applications include a monopolist who is trying to price discriminate
between buyers with different (privately known) willingness to pay, or a regulator who
wants to obtain the highest efficient output from a utility company with private information
about its cost.3
In this context, we conduct an experimental test of optimal contracts with hidden
information.  To our knowledge, this is the first experimental study of the static principal-
agent problem with hidden information.  There are two types of agents and it is common
information that these types are equally prevalent.  A principal selects one of three menus,
each having two possible contracts, to a pair of agents of unknown types.  Each individual
agent, who knows her own type and the menus available to the principal, then independently
selects one of the two contracts offered on the menu or rejects both.  Pecuniary incentive-
compatibility separates the types’ optimal choices for every menu and no rejections should
ever be observed.  The menus are ranked with respect to how much they favor the principal.
If both agents accept a contract, the contracts are implemented; if either agent rejects,
both the agents and the principal receive symmetric reservation payoffs (a treatment
variable).  By introducing contracts that must be accepted by both workers, we contemplate
the common situation where contracts must be negotiated with a union and then approved by
                                                
1 Throughout this paper we assume that the principal is male and the agents are female.
2 The original usage of the term “adverse selection” referred to a situation where someone purchasing an
insurance policy knows more than the insurance company about the likelihood of an accident or loss.
3 One-shot contracts are common in consumer transactions.  In the public sector, government procurement
is often conducted on a one-shot basis.
3the workers.4  Besides this feature, our environment (with 3-person groups and interactive
preferences) leads to a more natural and realistic structure for the way in which subjects
receive feedback, without (we will argue) otherwise distorting the contractual environment.
As people frequently do not act as pure money-maximizers in experiments, there is
the immediate conjecture that the usual theoretical predictions will be rejected.  However,
the pattern of any such rejections should be informative.  Interesting questions include the
“equilibrium” contract menu (if any), whether there is a separation by type, and whether the
level of the reservation payoffs affects behavior.5
One prediction of the standard theoretical model is that the high-type agents (the more
productive type) will get “efficient” contracts and informational rents, whereas low-type
agents get distorted contracts and no rents.  In our data we observe that whether or not the
different types of agents get substantial rents (as well as the size of these rents) depends
crucially on the available reservation payoff.  This should not be true under the standard
theory.  Another prediction of this model is that incomplete information will necessarily lead
to allocations that are only second-best efficient.6  In our experiment, we find that the
allocations obtained in the lab are sometimes first-best efficient.
We observe that principals usually initially propose the theoretically-predicted
contract, although it is intriguing that this is significantly more likely in the treatment with
                                                
4 In essentially all of Europe, more than 75% of all workers are covered by some form of collective
bargaining that involves trade unions (Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1994).  Our design assumes that a
contract structure that affects all workers needs to be approved by a supermajority rule.
5 Previous experimental studies (e.g., Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger 1997 and Fehr and Schmidt 2000)
argue that an implicit contract is often more beneficial than an explicit contract, despite the theoretical
predictions under the standard self-interest assumption.  We feel that their point is well taken, but note that
they compare complete contracting to incomplete contracting.  Our concern is the optimal complete
contract, as influenced by social preferences, in an environment where complete contracts are simple.
6 These are allocations that would be inefficient in the presence of complete information, but are the best a
principal can obtain due to informational constraints. Efficiency is defined in this paragraph in the absence
of social preferences.
4higher reservation payoffs.  When these early-period contracts are rejected sufficiently often
(how often depends very much on the individuals and on the reservation payoffs), the
principals who were offering them instead choose progressively less self-favorable
alternatives, until rejections cease and an “equilibrium” menu is reached.  This menu differs
across the two treatments.
Our analysis indicates that all three nonpecuniary models mentioned can generally
explain the observed behavior (with certain parameter restrictions) fairly readily.  This
suggests that contract theorists need not be overly concerned with the precise nature of social
preferences, as the enhanced descriptiveness seems robust to the model specification.
I. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Private information leads to inefficiency because it is effectively a form of monopoly
power (of information).  Sometimes it is possible to introduce competition (such as auctions)
as a method of reducing informational rents.  If competition is not a possibility, mechanism
design can still effectively minimize the rents of the privately informed, provided that there
are more dimensions in preferences than in the informational problem.  If a principal knows
workers care both about wages and the number of hours worked, he can devise a contract
menu of hours and wages that induces more truthful revelation and reduced inefficiency.
There is recent theoretical research about the impact of social preferences in optimal
contract design.  Casadesus-Masanell (1999) studies a principal-agent problem with moral
hazard and assumes that an agent suffers disutility if her action differs from the social
standard.  Thus, the strength of extrinsic monetary incentives is lower than in standard theory,
due to the trade-off between an agent’s intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. The analysis is
5performed (with qualitatively similar conclusions) when the motivating factor is an ethical
standard, similar to a social norm.
Rob and Zemsky (1999) study a problem in which agents working in a group (firm)
must undertake both an individual task and a cooperative task. Effort devoted to the
cooperative task is more productive than that devoted to the individual task, but the (noisy)
performance measure is such that a worker receives only partial credit for her cooperative
effort.  Employees receive disutility from not cooperating, depending on the past cooperation
levels in the group.  The (dynamic) problem of the principal is to manage the group so as to
maximize profits. As the solution has different steady state levels of cooperation (“corporate
cultures”) depending on the initial levels of cooperation, the incentive schemes vary across
groups.  Thus, this paper provides a theory for the observed heterogeneity in actual incentive
schemes, and an operative definition of corporate culture.
Dufwenberg and Lundholm (1999) study an unemployment insurance situation in
which there is moral hazard (unobservable job search effort) and adverse selection
(privately known productivity of effort).  The job search effort, although unobservable to the
regulator, is observable to other members of society.  Social pressure mitigates the moral
hazard problem, and effort is higher than under the absence of social concerns.  However,
individuals can pretend that the productivity of effort is lower than it really is; overall, the
distribution of social respect is not clearly welfare improving.  If one formulates an explicit
utilitarian welfare function, the impact of social values on welfare is not monotonic, and
welfare reaches a maximum for a positive but moderate social sensitivity.
Adverse selection has been studied extensively in private-auction experiments (see
Kagel 1995 for a review), but not in relation to the static optimal contract with unknown
types of agents.  Closer to our focus, Chaudhuri (1998) and Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and Gu
6(1999) study the ratchet effect, which can be a problem in dynamic contracting.  Here the
agent has an incentive to conceal his true type, as the principal may use this information to
ratchet up the demands for performance in later periods.  The main focus of these papers is
whether the agents will pool their actions to conceal their types, as the theory would predict,
and if they do not, whether the principals would exploit the information.  The theoretical
prediction without pre-commitment is that types will remain hidden, although the laboratory
results suggest otherwise.
However, the ratchet effect is not a concern in many contracting situations.  Principal-
agent interactions in the field are frequently one-shot affairs.  Furthermore, if the principal
could commit to an ex ante contract, it would be optimal to implement the one-shot problem
in the dynamic setting.  Even though a relationship may actually involve repeated play, a firm
could choose to pre-commit to a contract, and perhaps cultivate a reputation for integrity by
doing so.  In our experiment the issue is not so much whether agents will separate by contract
type (by and large they do), but which particular way to separate them will be acceptable to
the agents, and constitute an equilibrium.  It is curious that this dynamic application has been
studied earlier than the conceptually cleaner static problem.
In contracting under moral hazard (hidden action), the problem is how to induce the
efficient action without being able to observe it.  In principle, if outcomes are related to
actions, we can induce efficiency by making the contract contingent on the outcome.  Yet
impediments such as risk preferences and limited liability may be present. For example, it
may be necessary to have the agent incur some risk in order to induce the best action;
however, this may conflict with other contractual objectives, such as providing insurance.
Papers such as Berg, Daley, Dickhaut, and O’Brien (1992), Keser and Willinger
(2000), and Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein (1999) consider the behavioral issues
7present with individual contracting in this context.7  These studies provide evidence that
social preferences are a consideration that affects the ability of the principal to reduce
informational rents.  One caveat when risk preferences are an issue is that they are difficult to
control in the laboratory,8 so that disentangling the motivations for behavior may be
problematic.  Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein (1999) avoid this problem by severely
constraining the principal’s strategy space, but doing so may make the environment seem
somewhat unnatural.
II. THE MODEL
In this section we describe the theoretical model which serves as the basis for the
experimental design.  Imagine that a firm needs two workers in order to be able to operate.
The profits for the firm when it is operating are:
P = e1 – w1 + e2 – w2
where ei, wi are, respectively, the effort levels and wages of worker i Î {1,2}.  Each worker
i has a utility function which depends on her type j Î {H,L}, which is her private
information:
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7 Other studies involving moral hazard include Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), who examine the
incentive effects of piece rate and tournament payment schemes, and Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), who
investigate group incentive contracts.  The latter study finds that “relative performance schemes outperform
target-based schemes,” suggesting the relevance of social preferences to this context.  Plott, and Wilde
(1982), DeJong, Forsythe, and Lundholm (1985), and DeJong, Forsythe, Lundholm, and Uecker (1985)
consider moral hazard problems with multiple buyers and sellers. Güth, Klose, Königstein, and Schwalbach
(1998), consider a dynamic moral hazard problem where trust and reciprocity issues impede obtaining the
(theoretically possible) first-best outcome.
8 While the Roth and Malouf (1979) binary lottery procedure theoretically controls for risk preferences,
Selten, Sadrieh, and Abbink (1995) suggest that this procedure may actually exacerbate the problem
behaviorally.
8where kH = 1 and kL = k > 1.  That is, the high type of agent has a lower cost of effort than the
lower type.  Thus, only the individual agent knows j, but e is observable and contractible.
From the utility functions of the principal and the agents we have that the first-best
efforts levels are:
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We call ˆ e j  the efficient level of effort
9.  If we denote by U  the outside option of the worker
(which we assume for simplicity to be type-independent) we can induce optimal effort, with:
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If the (independent) probability that an agent is a high or low type is denoted respectively by
p
H  or p L , then the expected (optimal) profits for the principal are given by:
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The second-best optimal contracts, when the types are private information of the agents result
from the solution of the maximization program:
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9 This is an appropriate terminology because in all the Pareto-efficient allocations of this problem (with
complete information) the level of effort is always ˆ e j . This is so because of the quasi-linearity of the utility
function of the agents, a common assumption in this field. Thus, the Pareto-efficient allocations only differ
in the wages and profits of the principal and agent.
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where (IRj) and (ICj) are respectively the individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints of an agent of type j Î  {H,L}.  As usual in these problems, it turns out that the
active constraints in the optimal solution are (IRL) and (ICH), so that the solution is:
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The high type of agent provides the “efficient” level of effort and obtains utility above U .
These informational rents (rents are defined here as the utility an agent gets above her
reservation utility) are equal to:
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The effort of the low type of agent is “inefficiently” low and she obtains no rents.  This is a
sublime-perfect equilibrium.10
                                                
10 There is one slightly non-standard feature of this model that should be mentioned.  Since the agents’
decisions are simultaneous, and a rejection implies that both agents receive the outside option, there exist
subgame-perfect equilibria of the game, whose outcomes are different than the one we have just described.
If one agent expects the other to reject her contract, it is a best-response to reject contracts that give her a
higher utility than U .  This can be used to construct a variety of inefficient subgame-perfect equilibria.
However, notice that any strategy that rejects a contract yielding a higher utility than U is weakly
dominated. While such equilibria are subgame-perfect, they are not trembling-hand perfect (Selten 1965),
and do not survive one round of deletion of weakly-dominated strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg 1990).
)(IC)(
2
)(
2 L
22
H
L
HL
L
L e
k
we
k
w -³-
10
We implemented the theoretical model in our experiment by choosing values for the
parameters in the three possible menus; each menu offered two possible contracts (effort
choices).  While we thus limit the possibilities available to the principal, a continuous
strategy space would make the data analysis problematic  (even ignoring the increased
complexity of the decisions of the experimental participants), without adding much insight.
We chose kL = 2 for all menus, in order to give relatively large rents to the H type
(under her preferred contracts).  Menu 1 is the “theoretically-predicted” menu; it is not first-
best efficient and has the most unequal payoffs.  Here the values for ei, wi, are obtained from
equation (2).11  An H agent could obtain moderate rents (if she chose the “right” menu and
one of the contracts was accepted by the other agent) and an L agent could receive very small
rents.12  In Menu 2 the effort choices were the first-best efficient ones, computed from
equation (1).  The value for wL is set so that the L agent could receive small rents, while the
value for wH provides the H agent with higher rents than in Menu 1.  In Menu 3, both types of
agents can receive substantial rents, and (as in Menu 1) the efforts of both types correspond
to the optimal ones in the theoretical model.  The parameters, efforts, and wages for the
different menus in the experiment are summarized below:
TABLE 1 – PARAMETER VALUES
k L pL e H e L w H w L
Menu 1 2 1/2 1 0.33 0.69 0.24
Menu 2 2 1/2 1 0.50 0.88 0.63
Menu 3 2 1/2 1 0.33 0.94 0.49
                                                
11 All payoffs were rounded to the nearest 25 units in our payoff table.
12 In the theoretical model the rents for the L player are exactly zero. We chose to make the rents positive
(but very small) to make acceptance strictly dominant while remaining very close to the “theoretical
11
One of the criticisms of models of optimal contract design in adverse selection
contexts is that the theoretically-predicted contract menus are more “complex” than one
observes in reality.  In an environment like ours, these often employ a nonlinear structure and
a very large number of possible choices of pairs of wages and efforts. This would be quite
complicated to design for the principal, and even the choice of the agent would not be simple.
While we have selected a very simple structure (only two types), we feel that a “simple”
menu can serve as an approximation for the fully-optimal schedule.  As Wilson (1993) points
out (p. 146) in a representative example: “The firm’s profits from the 5-part and two-part
tariffs are 98.8% and 88.9% of the profits from the nonlinear tariff.”
III.  EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Six sessions were conducted at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona in May and
June of 1999.  All participants knew that there were 12 people in each session, with 4
principals, 4 high-type agents, and 4 low-type agents.   Groups of three (one principal and
two agents) were matched randomly in each of the 15 periods, subject to the (stated)
restriction that no group was ever repeated in consecutive periods.   While there were few
repeated 3-groups, each agent could expect to be matched with each principal several times
during the experimental session.  The average net pay was about 1600 pesetas (then around
$11) per subject, including a 500 peseta show-up fee.  Sessions lasted less than 2 hours.
At the beginning of a session, the instructions and a decision sheet were passed out to
each subject. The decision sheet stated the subject number and the role (principal, high-type
agent, or low-type agent).  Instructions (presented in Appendix 1) covered all rules used to
determine the payoffs to each player in the group; these were read aloud to the entire room.
We included a table showing the monetary payoffs for every possible combination of actions.
12
We verbally reviewed every case, and then asked questions to ensure that the process was
understood.
[Payoff table about here]
When the instructional phase was concluded, we proceeded with the session.  In each
period the principals first selected a menu on their decision sheets. Each matched agent could
accept choice 1 or 2 from this menu, or reject both options.  If both agents in the group
accepted contracts, each obtained the corresponding payoff for an agent of her type.  If either
of the agents rejected both choices 1 and 2, then the payoffs for both the principal and the
agents were the same (500 pesetas or 250 pesetas depending on the treatment).13
The experimenter went around the room collecting this information, with care taken to
preserve the anonymity (with respect to experimental role) of the principals.  Once the
principals’ menu selections were recorded, the experimenter again went around the room,
this time providing the information about the menu to the agents (again preserving anonymity).
The agents then made their choices and the experimenter collected this information; finally,
the experimenter privately informed each participant about the choices and types (but not the
identities) of both agents in the group.
Participants knew that there would be 15 periods in all.  At the end of the session,
participants were paid privately, based on the payoffs achieved in a randomly-selected
round, as was indicated in the instructions.14  As mentioned earlier, two types of sessions
were conducted. The only difference between the sessions was on the reservation payoffs for
                                                
13 In a sense, our game can be viewed as a multi-period 3-person version of the classic ultimatum bargaining
game (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982), where a rejection results in positive material payoffs.
14 This was done in an effort to make payoffs more salient to the subjects, as this method makes the nominal
payoffs 15 times as large as would be the case if payoffs were instead aggregated over 15 periods, and it also
avoids possible wealth effects from accumulated earnings.
13
a rejection - 500 pesetas for each person in one case and 250 pesetas in the other.  There
were three sessions of each treatment.
IV. RESULTS
We find that the incentive-compatibility mechanism is predominantly successful in
inducing a separation by contract selection among the agents who do not reject the contract
menu proposed.  However, there are many rejections of unfavorable contract menus by both
types of agents.  We also see a substantial degree of convergence on a “community
consensus” by the end of 15 periods.  If nonpecuniary utility is not a factor, one would expect
principals to choose Menu 1 and agents to accept the appropriate contract.  However, in each
of Treatments 1 and 2 (reservation payoffs of 500 and 250, respectively), Menu 1 is selected
only 35% of the time.  In Treatment 1 (Treatment 2), when Menu 1 is proposed, it is rejected
by at least one of the two agents 68% (40%) of the time.
A. Principal behavior
In Treatment 1, Menu 2 is chosen in 40 of 180 cases (22%) and Menu 3 was chosen
in 78 cases (43%). In Treatment 2, Menu 2 is chosen in 88 of 180 cases (49%) and Menu 3
was chosen in 29 cases (16%).
By one measure, the difference across treatments in the distribution of proposals
made is statistically significant at p < .001, using the Chi-square test (c2 = 40.45, d.f. = 2).
However, since there are 15 choices by each principal and these choices are unlikely to be
independent, the degree of significance is overstated.  As an alternative, we can apply a very
conservative test: We rank menu proposal rates from each session, treating each session as
only one independent observation, and then use the Wilcoxon rank-order test (see Siegel and
Castellan 1988).  Since the percentage of Menu 2 (Menu 3) contracts offered is lower
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(higher) in each and every Treatment 1 session than in each and every Treatment 2 session,
even this test indicates significance at p = .05.  The difference is accentuated in the later
periods in the sessions.  Figures 1 and 2 show the patterns of menu proposals over time
(Appendix 3 offers a chart of the aggregated proposals for each period):
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
The rate of Menu 1 proposals drops over time in each treatment.  If we look at the last
5 periods only, this rate is about 20% in each treatment.  In contrast, the rate for Menu 3
increases to 63% in the last 5 periods of Treatment 1, and the rate for Menu 2 increases to
67% in the last 5 periods of Treatment 2.  The trend for menu proposals over time seems
clear in each case.
B. Agent behavior
The principals do not change their behavior in a vacuum, but appear to respond to
agents’ rejections of contract menus.  Although agents who are concerned only with
maximizing their own material reward should never reject a contract menu, rejections are
quite common.15  When Menu 1 is proposed, it is rejected by at least one of the two agents
68% (40%) of the time in Treatment 1 (2).  No agent of any type ever rejected Menu 3 and no
H agent ever rejected Menu 2.
In Treatment 1, rejection rates of Menu 1 and Menu 2 are much higher for L types than
for H types.  (38/57 vs. 15/67 for Menu 1, and 36/44 vs. 0/36 for Menu 2).  However, there
is no such difference in Treatment 2.  L types are also far more likely to reject either Menu 1
or Menu 2 in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2 (38/57 vs. 11/62 for Menu 1 and 36/44 vs.
                                                
15 This contrasts with the results of the Chaudhuri (1998) study, which found few “rejections” by the high
productivity type firm in the 2nd (and final) period of his ratchet effect game.
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3/91 for Menu 2).  Overall, we also see nearly 3 times (89 to 30) as many rejections in
Treatment 1 as in Treatment 2. All of these observations suggest that subjects behaved in a
relatively “rational” manner, despite a willingness to sacrifice money to spurn a lopsided
contract menu.
We can examine whether rejection rates are stable over time.  A supergame
explanation for rejections would imply that rejection rates drop over time.  Figures 3 and 4
show the rates for the cases with observed rejections, aggregated over three periods for
smoothing:
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
Rejection rates of Menu 1 by H types are fairly stable in both treatments.  Rates for L types
increase where rejections seem to be effective - Menu 1 and Menu 2 in Treatment 1, as well
as Menu 1 in Treatment 2.  OLS regressions on (individual period) rejection rates over time
gives significant (t-statistic  > 1.96) positive coefficients in each of these cases.
C. Heterogeneity
While models of behavior often assume that all agents (of a given type) are identical,
we find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the population, for both principals and
agents.  A detailed table of individual agent behavior is presented in Appendix 4.16  Overall,
16/24 L agents and 11/24 H agents rejected at least one proposed menu.  In addition, 3 H
agents who never rejected a menu chose “low effort” at least once, sacrificing some money to
reduce the principal’s payoff.  While most players rejected at some point, the distribution of
the frequency of rejection is somewhat scattered, even within individual sessions.
16
Principal choices also vary considerably across individuals.  Of course, these
choices are affected by the variation in agent choices, so the best comparisons are within
sessions (principals 1-4, 5-8, and 9-12). A chart showing each principal menu choice and the
responses received is presented in Appendix 2.
TABLE 2 - INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPAL CHOICES
Principal # - Treatment 1
Menu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 5 8 3 3 6 6 9 4 3 5 4 6
2 6 4 1 3 5 1 5 3 1 1 5 5
3 4 3 11 9 4 8 1 8 11 9 6 4
Principal # - Treatment 2
Menu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 0 4 15 0 9 2 2 12 6 3 3 7
2 15 10 0 0 6 8 12 3 5 9 12 8
3 0 1 0 15 0 5 1 0 4 3 0 0
Given the sizable degree of heterogeneity for agents and principals, it should not be
surprising that behavior does not completely converge to an equilibrium in only 15 periods.
Yet the trends suggest that this heterogeneity might be overcome over time.
D. Earnings
Given the observed agent behavior, which menu should a purely self-interested
principal select?  We can calculate the ex post earnings of principals for each menu:
TABLE 3 - AVERAGE PRINCIPAL PAYOFFS
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
                                                                                                                                                    
16 The average number of rejections and the standard deviation in Treatment 1 is 6.17 (2.62) for L types and
1.25 (2.01) for H types; in Treatment 2 these are 1.17 (1.90) and 1.41 (1.62) for L and H types,
respectively.
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Session Menu
1
Menu
2
Menu
3
Session Menu
1
Menu
2
Menu
3
1 1132 1193 1612 4 2505 2212 1669
2 1426 921 1611 5 1723 2397 1617
3 1592 992 1597 6 1579 2313 1604
Total 1384 1038 1606 Total 1915 2312 1643
Table 3 confirms that the most prevalent menu in each treatment is also the most remunerative
for the principal.  It is interesting to note that, although the available menus and payoffs are
identical in the two treatments (except for the rejection payoffs), Menu 2 gives the lowest
principal payoffs in Treatment 1, but the highest principal payoffs in Treatment 2.  The
rejection payoffs are clearly relevant to the issue of which menu is optimal for a self-
interested principal.  Note that standard theory predicts that behavior should be identical for
these alternative reservation payoffs.
We can also examine first-best efficiency and distribution, in terms of the average
payoff received by each participant.  The expected average payoffs per person (assuming no
rejections) is nearly the same for each contract menu (1452, 1467, and 1446 for Menu 1, 2,
and 3, respectively).  Actual average earnings increase in later periods in Treatment 1; a
simple OLS regression of earnings against time indicates that earnings increase by 24 in each
period (t-statistic = 3.80).  The earnings pattern for Treatment 2 is more U-shaped, as there is
more of a lag before rejections become frequent.  An OLS earnings regression for Treatment
2 shows earnings increasing by an insignificant 8 per period; however, the same regression
excluding periods 1-3 shows average earnings increase by 25 each period (t-statistic =
2.42).17   It seems possible that the optimal social payoffs could be reached after more
periods of play.
                                                
17 Again, the t-statistics in these regressions are computed on the basis that each observation is independent.
Since there is interaction, the level of statistical significance may be overstated.
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How does the proportion of total earnings received by the principals vary over time
in each treatment?  A table showing the proportions for each period and treatment can be
found in Appendix 2.  The principal’s share of earnings declines after the first 3 periods of
Treatment 1 and settles into a range of 36%-46%.  In Treatment 2, this share is fairly stable
after the first period, ranging from 51%-58%.  The agents’ share of the social payoffs is
higher in Treatment 1 in every round but the 1st.  Overall, we see a trade-off between the size
of the total payoff and its distribution - total earnings are higher in Treatment 2, but players’
shares are more nearly equal in Treatment 1.
V. DISCUSSION
Standard principal-agent theory does not predict the behavior in either treatment,
although we do eventually observe low rejection rates and effort separation by the two types
of agent.  We also find that the different reservation payoffs lead to very different patterns of
menu selection.  Rejection rates are much higher in Treatment 1, where the reservation
payoffs are higher.  This seems entirely driven by the dramatic differences across treatments
in the rejection rates of L types (for Menu 1, 67% vs. 18%; for Menu 2, 82% vs. 3%).
A supergame notion might be suggested, since each agent expected to be matched with
each principal several times in a session.  Perhaps rejecters were hoping to face more
favorable menus in later periods and thought that their rejections would make this more
likely, even though all matches were anonymous.  Although this might explain rejections in
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early rounds, we have seen that there is no evidence of decreases in rejection rates over
time.18  Strategic motivations alone do not provide an explanation for the observed behavior.
A. Social preference models and individual behavior
Social preference models offer explanations concerning why people might sacrifice
money.  The Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) models presume that
all monetary sacrifice is driven by experienced disutility from unequal payoffs.  Charness
and Rabin (1999) combine Rawlsian preferences with a desire to increase total payoffs,
producing “quasi-maximin” preferences.  These default social preferences are then modified
by reciprocity considerations.
Since the principal selects the menu, and who also stands to earn the highest monetary
payoff, all of these models make similar predictions.  As in the ultimatum game, a monetary
sacrifice can be read variously as a response to an unfriendly allocation decision or a simple
dissatisfaction with lopsided payoffs.  It is not our aim in this paper to differentiate between
these models, but rather to demonstrate that all of them can potentially explain our data.  As it
is typical for a principal to receive the greater share in all contract menus, we feel that our
setup is reasonably representative of the field in labor environments and where a monopolist
is trying to price discriminate.
We examine the behavior of individuals under the light of these models; our analysis
provides some idea about the distribution of parameters in the population.  Overall, results
are similar for all three models.
                                                
18 A specific bit of evidence is that, in the very last round, seven principals tried Menu 1, perhaps thinking
that rejections were only being made for strategic purposes; however, these were rejected by all L types
(6/6) and 25% of H types (2/8).
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A.1. Models
Let ),,( 21 Pppp be the vector of monetary payoffs for the agent 1, agent 2, and
principal P in this experiment.  The Bolton and Ockenfels (1999) model can be applied to
our setup19 to make the utility of an agent i:
The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model has the following form in our setup:
Fehr and Schmidt note that there is very little evidence about aversion towards
difference in favor of a player, so that âi is a small number.  For simplicity we will calibrate
the parameter ái and arbitrarily consider âi to be ái/2.
The Charness and Rabin (1999) model, unlike the previous two, cannot be made a
function simply of the monetary payoffs of all participants. Here, one must imbed in the utility
function the actions (and perceived intentions) of people when making allocation choices.
                                                
19 This model is actually presented with a more general specification.  We have chosen a linear
representation, although we also performed an analysis with a quadratic functional form for disparities in
material payoffs.  The results were very similar.
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One of the key endogenous variables in the model is the “demerit coefficient” (r) which
indicates the degree to which reciprocity considerations affect choices.  While in principle r
depends on the strategies chosen by the agents, we simplify by setting r1 = r2 = 0 and rP =1
(rP =.5) when the principal chooses Menu 1 (Menu 2); these values are consistent with
equilibrium.  The agents’ utility in this model can then be parameterized as:
For the calibration we will make g = 0.2 and d = 0.5, so that the only parameter to be
calibrated will be f.20  The parameter values chosen are arbitrary, although plausible; a better
choice could improve the fit.
A.2. Observational Fit
If preferences were as described in the models, all the rejection rates should be either
zero or one, but many of them are between zero and one; we will argue that the agents seem
to be learning about rejection norms.    While this makes classification a bit problematic, we
will label an agent as a “rejector” of a given menu if she rejects it at least 50% of the time.
Table 4 shows the minimum parameter values that would induce a rejection of the menu:
                                                
20 In the full model, one’s demerit coefficient is multiplied by a parameter to determine the extent to which
one’s “right” to fair treatment has been forfeited by bad actions.   As the principal’s payoff is never the
minimum, we can simply consider the minimum of the agents’ payoffs.  We assume that the parameter
diminishing the weight of the principal’s payoff in the social surplus is high enough so that a principal not
choosing Menu 2 gets a weight of 0.
( ) úûùêëé ×--+×+-= å ÎÎ PPj jjjiPi fv prpdpdgpgppp }2,1{}2,1{21 )1(}{Min)1(),,(
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TABLE 4: PROPORTIONS OF REJECTORS AND CUTOFF PARAMETERS21
Menu-type-treatment Observed
Rejection rate
BO cutoff
(absolute value)
FS cutoff
(â=0.5*á)
CR cutoff
(rP=0.5 in M2)
M2 – L – 500 11/12 260 0.04 0.33
M1 – L – 500 9/12 130 0.02 0.17
M1 – L – 250 4/12 1410 0.24 0.64
M1 – H – 500 3/12 1600 0.20 0.47
M1 – H – 250 3/12 3050 0.38 0.83
M2 – L – 250 0/12 1580 0.26 0.86
M2 – H – 500 0/12 31700 1.52 2.03
M2 – H – 250 0/12 40100 1.92 2.54
The behavior over time and between menus is the only consistency check that can be
applied individual by individual. The remaining tests must be more population-oriented.22
Let us assume that the parameters of the individuals are chosen by Nature at the beginning of
time in a random manner. Notice that the parameters are ordered for the different menus and
treatments (and that they are ordered in similar ways for the three models). Given this, one
would expect that the numbers of “rejectors” would be ordered so that when the cutoff rate is
larger, the number of rejectors would be smaller.
In fact, this is definitely the general pattern.  While there are some minor reversals
and anomalies (discussed in detail in Appendix 6), these could easily be the result of slightly
different draws from the heterogeneous participant population.  The agents’ behavior is
mainly compatible with the social preference models.
                                                
21 We also performed calculations on the assumption that rP=1 in CR for both Menu 1 and Menu 2, that âi =
ái/4 or âi = 0 in FS, and using a quadratic specification for BO.  Results were very similar and we feel that
the assumptions made in Table 4 may be more realistic.
22 An additional test for behavioral consistency with the models is that an agent who rejects Menu 2 should
also reject Menu 1.  This is true because (as can be seen in Table 4) the parameter for rejection of Menu 1 is
always lower than the parameter for rejection of Menu 2 in all models.  There are only two cases when
agents who reject Menu 2 do not reject Menu 1: L types 1 and 8 in Treatment 1. However, once these
individuals start rejecting never revert to accepting a menu.  It is simply the case that they receive proposals
of Menu 1 in the early rounds, when they are actively learning the community rejection norms.
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We can also explore principal behavior in light of these models.  Measuring these
preferences is more complicated, as a principal is strategically concerned with the reaction
of the agents.  Nevertheless, some behavior must be explained, such as the fact that it is
common for principals to select Menu 1 in the initial periods.  At first glance, this seems to
be in conflict with a presumption of a significant degree of social preferences.  However,
notice that a principal would offer Menu 1 with certain parameter values: â < 0.66 in the FS
model, or c < 4600 in the BO model, or for any d £ 1 and g < 0.72 in the CR model.  Under
the assumption that principals and agents are drawn from the same population, it seems that
principal behavior does not contradict the social preference models, as we did not identify
any agents with parameters above these cutoff values.23
A final test of the calibrated parameters is a comparison between our results and
those of other experiments.  We present an analysis in Appendix 6, referring to data
presented in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and evidence from “similar” games in Charness and
Rabin (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2000).  On the whole, our imputed parameter values
are largely consistent with these data.
.
A.3 Further considerations
The predictions of the three social preference models we have discussed would not
change much (if at all) if each individual agent could only veto her own contract menu.  First,
if one agent believes the other agent will be (or should be) rejecting the contract as well, she
will not be inflicting any damage on the other agent by rejecting the contract menu.  The
Charness and Rabin (1999) model might predict a slightly greater tendency to reject lopsided
                                                
23 Recall that â  á in the FS model (we assumed a 1:2 relationship for our calibration).  We observed very
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contract menus, since a unilateral rejection avoids reducing the payoffs of the blameless other
agent, as is preferred under the quasi-maximin formulation.  On the other hand, both the
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) models might predict a slightly
reduced rejection rate, since one cannot be as effective in “leveling” the payoffs by making a
monetary sacrifice.  In any event, 3-person ultimatum game studies such as Güth and van
Damme (1998) and Kagel and Wolfe (1999) find that responders do not seem to be much
concerned with the welfare of an inactive third party, so we suspect behavior would be
robust to this design choice.
Another issue to consider in the light of social preferences is which contract is
efficient, in the sense of being socially desirable.  In our design, with a limited set of
contracts, efficiency is not an issue, as all the contracts are Pareto-efficient. But if we
consider the (utilitarian) sum of payoffs as a welfare criterion, it turns out that Menu 2 is the
socially desirable, when social preferences are not considered, but Menu 3 maximizes the
(expected) sum of utilities when social preferences are taken into account24.  This suggests
that the welfare implications of optimal contract theory may be modified once the model is
generalized to account for these issues.
Since our experiment is fairly typical of the mechanism design literature, one can be
reasonably confident that the conclusions obtained (once the models are modified to account
for social preferences) are not very sensitive to the particular way in which these social
preferences are modeled.  We believe that this is a positive aspect of our study.
B. Learning
                                                                                                                                                    
few (if any) individuals for whom á was greater than 0.65.
24 For the most common combination of parameters consistent with our data
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Fifteen periods is certainly too short for a serious learning analysis.  Nevertheless,
we have seen that choices change over time; perhaps participants are learning something
along the way.  First, the principals observe the responses to proposed contract menus and
update their beliefs about the norms of the population of agents.  Table 5 presents the data
concerning whether or not a principal changed the contract menu after observing either joint
acceptance or a rejection by at least one agent (14 observations for each principal):
TABLE 5 – MENU CHANGES BY PRINCIPALS
No rejection in prior period Rejection in prior period
Change No change Change No change
Treatment 1 (500) 34 (33%) 69 (67%) 49 (75%) 16 (25%)
Treatment 2 (250) 42 (30%) 99 (70%) 14 (52%) 13 (48%)
It is apparent that principals are substantially more likely to select a different menu
after a rejection than after no rejection – 75% vs. 33% in Treatment 1 (p < .0001), and 52%
vs. 30% in Treatment 2 (p = .01, one-tailed test).  These sequential dependencies suggest that
rejections drive the change in principal behavior over time.
 A rather interesting and puzzling result is that a significant number of agents do not
respond in a consistent manner to the contract menus (See Appendix 5).  It may be the case
that some agents are uncertain about the appropriate response, and update with the revealed
actions of others.  Some agents appear to learn to reject contract menus.
If we define “internal consistency” as no more than one deviation from consistent
play, we have that 13 of 47 agents (27%) make at least two choices inconsistent with their
other ones.  If we define consistency such that even one “tremble” is a violation, 30 of 48
agents (62%) are inconsistent.  One test of whether inconsistent choices are merely arbitrary
is whether agents behave differently when they observe that the other agent in the triad has
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rejected a contract menu.  Appendix 4 presents the likelihood of rejection for both types of
agent, contingent on a rejection by another agent in the previous period.  We can perform
some simple statistical tests for sequential dependencies on these data.
Consider Menu 1: In Treatment 1, L types reject Menu 1 12/15 times (80%) after a
menu was rejected by another agent, compared to 26/42 times (62%) otherwise.  Similarly,
H types reject Menu 1 6/18 times (33%) after another agent rejects a menu, compared to 9/49
times (18%) otherwise.  Each of these differences is only marginally significant statistically
(Z @ 1.30, p @ .10, one-tailed test).  If we aggregate these proportions to increase the number
of observations, we see that agents reject Menu 1 18/33 times (55%) after observing a
rejection, but only 35/91 times (38%) otherwise; the test of proportions gives Z = 1.60, p @
.05, one-tailed test.25
Since there are far fewer rejections in Treatment 2, it should not be surprising that
differences are not statistically significant - agents reject Menu 1 3/9 times (33%) after
observing a rejection, compared to 24/117 times (20%) otherwise. While the difference goes
in the expected direction, the test of proportions only gives Z = 0.93, p = .18.  In response to
Menu 2, L types show little difference in rejection rates across treatments– 13/16 (81%) vs.
23/28 (82%) in Treatment 1, and 0/15 (0%) vs. 3/76 (4%) in Treatment 2.26  While agents
may be uncertain about whether is it “reasonable” to reject the most lopsided contract menu,
the choice of rejecting Menu 2 seems idiosyncratic and unaffected by the choices of other
agents.
                                                
25 Note that these tests assume independence for possible multiple observations of an agent’s behavior, and
so the significance may be overstated.
26 Since H types never reject Menu 2, there is obviously no difference in behavior induced by observing a
rejection (0/12 vs. 0/24 in Treatment 1; 0/7 vs. 0/78 in Treatment 2).
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It is clear that further evidence is needed.  We feel that the issue of learning
experimental social norms may be a fruitful area for future research.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our evidence suggests that, while there are many lopsided contract menus proposed
and rejected in early periods, the principals quickly learn the group standard for menu
acceptability and the production team functions thereafter in a relatively efficient manner.  It
is interesting that changing the reservation payoffs leads to a different menu becoming a
quasi-equilibrium after a number of periods, even though standard contract theory would
predict no differential effect.
We observe a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the behavior of both principals
and agents.  This may be due to differing perceptions about what is the “fair” menu that
should be offered.  There is also evidence that agents are unsure about whether to reject
contract menus and are influenced by the observed choices of other agents.  Perhaps these
agents update their views about the social norms and adjust their values accordingly.  The
socially-appropriate action is not always obvious and so it seems reasonable that some
people look to their peers for guidance.  More research on this issue is needed.
Overall, we can say that the behavior of agents seems mostly consistent with the three
models of  “social preferences” described in the previous section.  We think that this is
important, because it shows that principal-agent models would give more realistic
predictions if they incorporated this social dimension in the models. For example, it is
possible that this is the reason why observed incentive schemes are much less “powerful”
than would be expected given standard theory (see Jensen and Murphy 1990). The
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documented absence of relative performance pay within firms (Garen 1994) might also be the
result from these considerations. To the extent that these data generalize, it appears there is
considerable scope for integrating social preferences into contract theory.
We have emphasized that, in our design, different models of social preferences have
similar degrees of success in explaining our data.  It is obvious from earlier research (e.g.,
Charness and Rabin 1999) that this is not a general result in all contexts, so it could be
interesting to examine contracting problems where the models make different predictions.
For example, the predictions of the various models would differ more strongly if the high-
type agent, instead of the principal, was eligible to receive the largest share.
For reasons of simplicity, and to focus on the interactive nature of preferences, we
have limited the contract space.  One could relax that constraint to explore the extent to which
complexity issues are important in this interaction.  This would also allow us to check if the
“social optimality” of contracts that we observe in Treatment 1 extends when the contract
choice is richer.
Since more effective contracts are likely to lead to better economic outcomes, we feel
that further research on contracts and social preferences is warranted.
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APPENDIX 1 - INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  The experiment will consist of a
series of 15 decision periods. In each period you will be randomly and anonymously matched
with two other persons; the action you choose and the action chosen by the persons with
whom you are matched will jointly determine your payoffs in each period.
You have been assigned a subject number. Please retain this number, as we will need
it to pay you at the end of the experiment.
Process: There are two classes of players: proposers and responders.  The responders can
be one of two types: HIGH or LOW. The class to which the player is assigned (proposer or
responder) and the type of the players (in the case the player is a responder) are chosen
randomly at the beginning of the game. Each responder has an equal initial probability to be
of either type HIGH or type LOW. Half of all responders will be of each type. Each
responder knows his type, but no other participant does. Your role (class and type) will not
change during the experiment. Your subject number, class and type (if you are a responder)
are printed on the decision sheet we have given you.
In each period you will be randomly-matched in groups of three players, according to
subject numbers.  All groups will be composed of a proposer and two responders of any
combination of types; ex ante, there is a 25% chance that both responders are HIGH, a 50%
chance that one is HIGH and the other is LOW, and a 25% chance that both are LOW.27  The
identity of the other players in the group is unknown to you and the composition of the groups
will change randomly every period.  While you will not know the matching process, we
would be happy to show you (at the end of the experiment) how the matches were created.
Once the period begins each proposer must make a selection from one of 3 possible
choices {1,2,3} and will do so by checking a box for that period on the decision sheet
provided.  We will come around the room and record each proposer selection.  Next we will
go around the room and mark the proposer selections on the decision sheets of the responders
in the appropriate groups.  At this point, the two responders in each group must each choose
one of the three available options {1,2,VETO} by checking the corresponding box on the
decision sheet. (For both proposers and responders, we ask that you do not fill in the spaces
clearly marked as EXPERIMENTER.)  We will then record these choices.  Finally, we will
once again go around the room and mark the responder decisions (and the type of responders)
for each group on the decision sheets for all members of that group.  At this point, you can
calculate your payoff from the period from the table provided.
How choices depend on points: The payoffs will be a function of the proposer's choice and
the responders' responses. Please refer to the table provided and we will offer some
examples of how this process works.  [This Table is at the end of Appendix 1.]
First, you should understand that, unless one of the responders chooses to VETO the
proposer's choice, the payoff for any responder depends only on the proposer's choice and
the responder's choice.  No person will ever receive a negative payoff unless she chooses it
herself.
                                                
27 In fact, these were the actual probabilities, given our matching scheme  (see Appendix 2).  The ex ante
probabilities are 3/14, 4/7, and 3/14.
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If either responder chooses to VETO the proposal, then the VETO payoffs (shown in
the columns shaded in gray on the payoff table in your packet) would result.
If you are a Responder, you may be wondering how you can tell if you are Responder
1 or Responder 2. There is an algorithm you can use which will make your task easier: if you
are a Responder of the HIGH type, simply consider yourself to be Responder 1; if you are a
Responder of the LOW type, simply consider yourself to be Responder 2. In all cases, this
will ensure that your payoffs correspond to your choices.
Suppose the proposer chooses option 1 and faces responders who are both type
HIGH. Suppose further that both responders choose option 1. First, find the rows
corresponding to Proposer Choice 1.  Next, find the 5 columns corresponding to the case
where both responders are HIGH.  The column that is relevant in this case is headed by “11”.
As you can see, the Proposer would receive 3950 pesetas, Responder 1 would receive 775
pesetas and Responder 2 would receive 775 pesetas.  Suppose instead that Responder 1
chooses option 1 and Responder 2 chooses option 2. The column that is now relevant is
headed by “12”.  In this case the Proposer would receive 3075 pesetas, Responder 1 (who
chose option 1) would receive 775 pesetas, and Responder 2 (who chose option 2) would
receive 725 pesetas.  If instead Responder 1 chooses option 2 and Responder 2 chooses
option 1, the column that is now relevant is headed by “21”. In this case the Proposer would
receive 3075 pesetas, Responder 1 (who chose option 2) would receive 725 pesetas, and
Responder 2 (who chose option 1) would receive 775 pesetas.  If instead Responder 1
chooses option 2 and Responder 2 chooses option 2, the column that is now relevant is
headed by “22”.  In this case the Proposer would receive 2175 pesetas, Responder 1 would
receive 725 pesetas, and Responder 2 would receive 725 pesetas.  Suppose instead that
either Responder chooses to VETO the proposer's choice.  In this case, the Proposer would
receive 500 pesetas and each Responder would receive 500 pesetas.
Suppose the Proposer chooses option 2 and faces two LOW Responders.  First, find
the rows corresponding to Proposer Choice 2.  Next, find the 5 columns corresponding to the
case in which both responders are LOW.  Suppose further that both responders choose option
1.  The column that is relevant in this case is headed by “11”. As you can see, the Proposer
would receive 2500 pesetas, Responder 1 would receive -550 pesetas and Responder 2
would receive -550 pesetas.  Suppose instead that Responder 1 chooses option 1 and
Responder 2 chooses option 2.  The column that is now relevant is headed by “12”.  Then the
Proposer would receive 2400 pesetas, Responder 1 (who chose option 1) would receive -
550 pesetas, and Responder 2 (who chose option 2) would receive 550 pesetas.  If instead
Responder 1 chooses option 2 and Responder 2 chooses option 1, the column that is now
relevant is headed by “21”.  Then the Proposer would receive 2400 pesetas, Responder 1
(who chose option 2) would receive 550 pesetas, and Responder 2 (who chose option 1)
would receive -550 pesetas.  If instead Responder 1 chooses option 2 and Responder 2
chooses option 2, the column that is now relevant is headed by “22”. Then the Proposer
would receive 2300 pesetas, Responder 1 would receive 550 pesetas, and Responder 2
would receive 550 pesetas.  Suppose instead that either Responder chooses to VETO the
proposer's choice. In this case, the Proposer would receive 500 pesetas and each Responder
would receive 500 pesetas.
Suppose the Proposer chooses option 3 and faces one HIGH responder and one LOW
responder (by the way the table is written, the type HIGH is necessarily Responder 1 and the
type LOW is necessarily Responder 2).  First, find the rows corresponding to Proposer
Choice 3.  Next, find the 5 columns corresponding to the case where one responder is HIGH
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and the other is LOW.  Suppose further that both responders choose option 1. The column that
is relevant in this case is headed by “11”. As you can see, the Proposer would receive 2050
pesetas, Responder 1 would receive 1725 pesetas and Responder 2 would receive -325
pesetas.  Suppose instead that Responder 1 chooses option 1 and Responder 2 chooses
option 2. The column that is now relevant is headed by “12”.  Then the Proposer would
receive 1625 pesetas, Responder 1 (who chose option 1) would receive 1725 pesetas, and
Responder 2 (who chose option 2) would receive 1000 pesetas.  If instead Responder 1
chooses option 2 and Responder 2 chooses option 1, the column that is now relevant is
headed by “'21”.  Then the Proposer would receive 1625 pesetas, Responder 1 (who chose
option 2) would receive 1225 pesetas, and Responder 2 (who chose option 1) would receive
-325 pesetas.  If instead Responder 1 chooses option 2 and Responder 2 chooses option 2,
the column that is now relevant is headed by “22”.  Then the Proposer would receive 1175
pesetas, Responder 1 would receive 1225 pesetas, and Responder 2 would receive 1000
pesetas. Suppose instead that either Responder chooses to VETO the proposer's choice.  In
this case, the Proposer would receive 500 pesetas and each Responder would receive 500
pesetas.
Payment: Each person will be paid individually and privately.  Only one of the 15 periods
will be chosen at random for actual payment, using a die with multiple sides.  In addition,
you will receive 500 pesetas for participating in the experiment. If, in the period selected
your payoff is negative, it will be deducted from the 500 peseta show-up fee; however, no
one will receive a net payoff less than 0.
If you have questions raise your hand and one of us will come and answer your question.
Direct communication between participants is strictly forbidden.  Please ask questions if you
do not fully understand the instructions.  Are there any questions?
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PAYOFF TABLE
2  HIGH responders 1 HIGH, 1 LOW responder 2 LOW responders
11 12 21 22 VETO 11 12 21 22 VETO 11 12 21 22 VETO
Proposer 3950 3075 3075 2175 500 3950 3075 3075 2175 500 3950 3075 3075 2175 500
Responder 1 775 775 725 725 500 775 775 725 725 500 -1275 -1275 525 525 500
Responder 2 775 725 775 725 500 -1275 525 -1275 525 500 -1275 525 -1275 525 500
Proposer 2500 2400 2400 2300 500 2500 2400 2400 2300 500 2500 2400 2400 2300 500
Responder 1 1450 1450 1050 1050 500 1450 1450 1050 1050 500 -550 -550 550 550 500
Responder 2 1450 1050 1450 1050 500 -550 550 -550 550 500 -550 550 -550 550 500
Proposer 2050 1625 1625 1175 500 2050 1625 1625 1175 500 2050 1625 1625 1175 500
Responder 1 1725 1725 1225 1225 500 1725 1725 1225 1225 500 -325 -325 1000 1000 500
Responder 2 1725 1225 1700 1225 500 -325 1000 -325 1000 500 -325 1000 -325 1000 500
APPENDIX 2 - INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPAL CHOICES AND RESPONSES
A matching scheme was randomly-determined (subject to no group repeating in two
consecutive periods) and was used in all sessions.  One can track the entire history of the
sessions, given the matching scheme below and the results presented in previous Tables.
Principals were # 1, 2, 11, and 12; H types were # 3, 4, 9, and 10; L types were # 5, 6, 7, and
8:
Period Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
1 1 10 6 2 4 3 11 9 5 12 7 8
2 1 4 3 2 5 6 11 9 7 12 10 8
3 1 9 7 2 4 5 11 3 10 12 8 6
4 1 3 6 2 9 5 11 10 7 12 4 8
5 1 6 5 2 4 8 11 3 7 12 10 9
6 1 9 4 2 3 7 11 8 5 12 10 6
7 1 10 7 2 6 8 11 3 4 12 9 5
8 1 6 7 2 10 3 11 5 8 12 4 9
9 1 3 7 2 9 6 11 10 5 12 4 8
10 1 4 5 2 7 6 11 10 9 12 3 8
11 1 10 5 2 9 7 11 8 6 12 3 4
12 1 6 8 2 5 7 11 3 9 12 10 4
13 1 7 5 2 4 10 11 3 6 12 9 8
14 1 6 8 2 4 9 11 3 5 12 10 7
15 1 10 4 2 8 5 11 3 6 12 9 7
TREATMENT 1
Prop. Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 1*/ 2 2 1* 2** 2 3 2** 1* 2* 1* 3 3 3 1*
2 1 2 1 1*/ 1* 2* 1** 1* 3 2* 3 3 1 2 1**
3 1 1* 1* 2* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 1* 1** 1* 2* 3 2* 2* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
5 1* 1 1** 2* 1** 3 2 2** 1* 3 1* 3 2** 3 2
6 1 1* 1 1** 2*/ 1* 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
7 1/ 1** 1 1* 2* 1** 1 2** 2* 1* 2** 1* 2* 3 1*
8 1 1* 1* 3 2 2* 2* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1**
9 1 1/ 1** 3 2* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
10 1/ 1* 1*/ 2* 1*/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1/ 3 3
11 1* 1* 2 3 2* 3 3 2** 3 3 1* 2 2 1* 3
12 1* 1* 2 3 3 1 2* 1 3 2* 3 1/ 2* 2* 1*
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TREATMENT 2
Prop. Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 2 2 2 2 2* 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 3 2* 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1** 2 2 2
3 1/ 1 1 1 1 1* 1 1* 1 1 1* 1 1 1 1*
4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
5 1 1 1 1 1 1* 1* 1 1/ 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 1* 2 2 3 2 3 2 3
7 3 2 2 2 2 1 1*/ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
8 1 1* 1 1* 1 1 1* 1* 1/ 1* 1// 2 1* 2 2
9 1 3 2 1* 1 3 2 3 2 1* 2 1* 3 2* 1
10 2 2 2 1 1** 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
11 1 2 1* 2 2 2 2 1* 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
12 1* 1 1 1* 2 2 1 1* 2 1* 2 2 2 2 2
* means a rejection,  ** means both agents rejected.
/ means a low play by an H type.  // means two low plays by H types.
Principals 1-4 were in the first session in the treatment, 5-8 were in the second session, and
9-12 were in the third session.
AGGREGATED MENU PROPOSALS BY PERIOD
Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Treatment 1
Menu 1 12 10 9 4 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 5
Menu 2 0 2 3 4 6 4 4 4 1 3 1 1 4 2 1
Menu 3 0 0 0 4 3 5 6 5 9 8 8 9 6 9 6
Treatment 2
Menu 1 7 5 5 6 6 4 5 7 3 4 3 3 2 1 2
Menu 2 3 5 4 5 5 4 5 2 8 7 7 8 7 10 8
Menu 3 2 2 3 1 1 4 2 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 2
PRINCIPAL % OF TOTAL EARNINGS
Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Treatment 1 66 51 53 36 37 41 43 46 37 37 37 41 46 38 38
Treatment 2 63 57 54 55 58 53 55 52 55 55 53 54 51 53 53
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APPENDIX 3 – INDIVIDUAL AGENT CHOICES BY PERIOD
TREATMENT 1 (500)
Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
L1 1/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 2/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2 2/3 1/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 1/3
L2 1/3 2/2 1/2 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2
L3 1/2 1/3 2/2 2/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 2/3 1/3 2/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2
L4 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 3/2 1/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 1/3
L5 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 3/2 1/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2
L6 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2 2/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 1/3
L7 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/2 2/3 1/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 2/3 3/2 1/3
L8 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/2 2/3 1/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2
L9 1/2 1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 3/2 2/3 2/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 1/3 3/2
L10 1/1 1/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 1/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 1/2 3/2 2/2 3/2 3/2
L11 1/3 1/2 1/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 2/3 1/3
L12 1/2 1/3 2/3 3/2 1/3 3/2 3/2 2/3 3/2 2/3 1/3 3/2 2/3 3/2 3/2
H1 1/2 2/1 1/1 1/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 1/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1
H2 1/1 2/1 1/1 2/2 1/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 2/1 1/1
H3 1/1 1/1 2/1 1/3 3/1 2/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 3/1
H4 1/2 1/3 1/3 2/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 1/3 3/1 3/1 1/1 3/1 1/1 3/1 1/3
H5 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 2/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 2/2 3/1 1/1
H6 1/1 1/1 1/1 3/1 2/2 3/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1
H7 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 1/3 3/1 1/3 3/1 3/1 1/3
H8 1/1 1/3 1/1 1/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 2/1
H9 1/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 3/2 2/1 2/1 1/1 3/1
H10 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/1 1/2 3/1 3/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 1/2 1/2 3/1 3/1
H11 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 2/1 3/1 1/1
H12 1/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 3/1
In this table, “x/y” indicates Menu x and response y, where 1 means “high effort”, 2 means “low
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TREATMENT 2 (250)
Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
L1 1/2 2/2 3/2 2/3 2/3 1/3 3/2 1/3 1/2 2/2 2/2 1/3 2/2 1/2 2/2
L2 2/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/3 2/2 1/2 2/2 1/3
L3 3/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/3 2/2 3/2 3/2
L4 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 3/2 3/2 1/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2
L5 3/2 1/2 3/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 3/2
L6 1/1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
L7 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 3/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2 3/2 2/2
L8 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 3/2
L9 1/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2
L10 1/1 2/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 3/2 3/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
L11 1/3 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 3/2 2/2 2/2
L12 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/2 3/2 1/3 2/2 1/3 2/2 1/3 2/2 2/3 2/2
H1 1/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
H2 1/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 2/1 2/1
H3 1/2 1/1 2/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 3/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 3/1 2/1 3/1
H4 2/1 3/1 1/1 1/2 3/1 3/1 2/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 2/1
H5 2/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 1/2 1/1 1/2 1/3 1/2 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1
H6 2/1 1/1 3/1 1/3 2/1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 2/1 1/2 2/1 3/1 2/1 2/1
H7 3/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 1/1 1/1 1/3 1/1 2/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 1/3 2/1 2/1
H8 1/1 1/3 2/1 2/1 1/1 1/1 1/3 1/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 2/1
H9 2/1 3/1 1/3 1/3 2/1 3/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 1/3 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1
H10 2/1 3/1 2/1 1/3 1/3 3/1 2/1 1/3 2/1 1/3 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 1/1
H11 1/1 2/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 2/1 1/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1
H12 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 3/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 1/1
In this table, “x/y” indicates Menu x and response y, where 1 means “high effort”, 2 means “low
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APPENDIX 4 - REJECTIONS BY AGENTS28
Treatment 1 (500)
L types
6/7 reject M1 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
2/2 reject M2 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
4/5 reject M1 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
5/7 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
2/3 reject M1 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
6/7 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
H types
0/3 reject M1 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
0/2 reject M2 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
5/6 reject M1 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
0/7 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
1/9 reject M1 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
0/4 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
Treatment 2 (250)
L types
1/4 reject M1 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
0/7 reject M2 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
0/3 reject M1 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
0/4 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
0/0 reject M1 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
0/2 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
H types
2/2 reject M1 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
0/3 reject M2 in the period after a high type rejects menu 1
0/3 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 1
0/1 reject M2 in the period after a low type rejects menu 2
                                                
28 We also include responses with a one-period lag if the menu offered in the next period after the rejection
was menu 3.
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INDIVIDUAL AGENT BEHAVIOR
L types
L1 L2 L3 L4
Session M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
1 2/5 3/4 3/4 4/5 2/3 3/5 6/6 1/1
2 4/7 4/4 5/5 5/5 6/7 3/4 1/4 3/3
3 3/4 4/4 0/4 0/3 3/4 2/2 3/4 4/4
4 3/6 2/7 2/3 0/10 1/4 0/8 0/4 0/4
5 0/4 0/8 0/7 0/8 0/5 0/8 0/8 0/6
6 0/6 0/8 0/5 0/8 1/2 0/10 4.8 1/6
H types
H1 H2 H3 H4
Session M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
1 0/5 0/2 0/5 0/5 1/3 0/4 4/7 0/2
2 0/9 0/3 0/4 0/1 6/7 0/2 1/7 0/5
3 0/3 0/5 0/7 0/0 3/5 0/4 0/5 0/2
4 0/9 0/4 0/3 0/6 0/4 0/6 0/5 0/5
5 1/7 0/7 4/7 0/6 2/6 0/7 2/6 0/8
6 3/3 0/9 4/5 0/8 0/5 0/9 0/4 0/10
X/Y in each cell refers to: Times the agent chose rejection/Times menu was offered
41
APPENDIX 5 – CONSISTENCY OF AGENT CHOICES
Treatment 1 (500) Treatment 2 (250)
Agent Response to
Menu 1
Response to
Menu 2
Response to
Menu 1
Response to
Menu 2
2 R 2 R 2 R 2 R
L1 3 2 1 3 3 3 5 2
L2 1 3 1 4 1 2 10 0
L3 1 2 2 3 3 1 8 0
L4 0 6 0 1 4 0 4 0
L5 3 4 0 4 4 0 8 0
L6 0 5 0 5 5 0 8 0
L7 1 6 1 3 5 0 7 0
L8 3 1 0 3 8 0 6 0
L9 1 3 0 4 6 0 8 0
L10 4 0 3 0 4 0 8 0
L11 1 3 0 2 1 1 10 0
L12 1 3 0 3 4 4 5 1
Treatment 1 (500) Treatment 2 (250)
Agent Response to
Menu 1
Response to
Menu 2
Response to
Menu 1
Response to
Menu 2
1 2 R 1 2 R 1 2 R 1 2 R
H1 9 0 0 4 0 0 9 0 0 4 0 0
H2 3 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 0 6 0 0
H3 3 1 0 6 0 0 3 1 0 6 0 0
H4 4 1 0 5 0 0 4 1 0 5 0 0
H5 3 3 1 2 0 0 3 3 1 2 0 0
H6 1 2 4 7 0 0 1 2 4 7 0 0
H7 4 0 2 7 0 0 4 0 2 7 0 0
H8 4 0 2 7 0 0 4 0 2 7 0 0
H9 0 0 3 9 0 0 0 0 3 9 0 0
H10 1 0 4 9 0 0 1 0 4 9 0 0
H11 5 0 0 9 0 0 5 0 0 9 0 0
H12 3 0 0 10 0 0 3 0 0 10 0 0
Choices 1, 2, and Reject are denoted “1”, “2”, and “R”, respectively
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APPENDIX 6 –ANOMALIES AND CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER DATA
Menu-type-treatment Observed
Rejection rate
BO cutoff
(absolute value)
FS cutoff
(â=0.5*á)
CR cutoff
(rP=0.5 in M2)
M2 – L – 500 11/12 260 0.04 0.33
M1 – L – 500 9/12 130 0.02 0.17
M1 – L – 250 4/12 1410 0.24 0.64
M1 – H – 500 3/12 1600 0.20 0.47
M1 – H – 250 3/12 3050 0.38 0.83
M2 – L – 250 0/12 1580 0.26 0.86
M2 – H – 500 0/12 31700 1.52 2.03
M2 – H – 250 0/12 40100 1.92 2.54
Anomalies
None of the social preference models have a complete alignment with parameter cut-
off values and the observed rejection behavior.  Let us examine the anomalies model by
model
For CR the only problem is that the proportion of low type “rejectors” of menu 1 in
treatment 2 should be lower than the high type “rejectors” of menu 1 and in the data it is
higher (4 versus 3). However the difference is small and statistically insignificant.  The other
two models have somewhat bigger problems.
The FS model predicts that Menu 1 rejections for the high types in treatment 1 should
be larger than Menu 1 rejections for low types in treatment 2, whereas we have the opposite
(3 versus 4).  This model also predicts that Menu 1 rejections for high types in treatment 2
should be lower than Menu 2 rejections for low types in treatment 2, whereas we have higher
(3 versus 0).
Similarly, the BO model has the problem that Menu 2 rejections for low types in
treatment 2 should be higher than the Menu 1 rejection rates for high types in both treatments,
whereas it is actually lower (0 versus 3). These differences are a bit worrisome, although not
statistically significant (the Fisher exact test gives a one-tailed p = .11; see Siegel and
Castellan 1988).
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Comparison with other experimental data
With respect to FS, we can infer from Table A that about 1/12 of the players have an
ai parameter between 0 and 0.02, 8/12 have parameters between 0.02 and 0.2 or 0.3, and
3/12 have a parameter larger than 0.3 but smaller than 2. Table III in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) offers data suggesting that 30% of subjects have a value of 0, 30% have a value of
0.5, 30% have a value of 1 and 10% have a value of 4. Our estimated values shift the
distribution a bit towards the left (it gives more weight to smaller values) but, given the
relatively small numbers, it does not look like an important difference.
We can also compare our results with evidence from “similar” games in Charness
and Rabin (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2000).29 When B has a choice between (A,B)
payoffs of (800,200) or (0,0), 11% of the population (13/114) have an implied á i parameter
larger than 0.33, and when B has a choice between (750,400) and (375,375), 29% of the
population (15/52) have an implied á i parameter larger than 0.07.  In our data, we have
11/12 larger than 0.02 and 3/12 larger than about 0.25; these proportions seem roughly
consistent.  Checking BO with these data, the (800,200) vs. (0,0) choices suggest that 11%
have an implied ci parameter larger than 2222 and the (375,375) vs. (750,400) suggest that
29% have a value of ci larger than 1080.  Again comparing with our data, we have 11/12
larger than 75 and 3/12 larger than about 1000; once again, these proportions seem roughly
consistent.
                                                
29 We use the data from 5 games: 1) A can choose (500,500) or enter.  If A enters, B chooses (800,200) or
(0,0); 2) A can choose (750,750) or enter.  If A enters, B chooses (800,200) or (0,0); 3) A can choose
(700,300) or enter.  If A enters, B chooses (800,200) or (0,0); 4) A can choose (550,550) or enter.  If A
enters, B chooses (75,400) or (375,375); 5) A can choose (750,750) or enter.  If A enters, B chooses
(750,400) or (375,375).
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FIGURE 1 
Proposals over Time (Treatment 1)
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FIGURE 2 
Proposals over Time (Treatment 2)
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FIGURE 3 
Rejection Rates over Time (Treatment 1)
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FIGURE 4 
Rejection Rates over Time (Treatment 2)
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